Most teams now have an AI agent running that has to reach internal and external systems. An internal API, a few external apps, an API behind a static key, a service account, an MCP server: each one secured differently. As long as every agent arranges that for itself, it piles up separate credentials everywhere and afterwards you can no longer see which agent did what.
The answer is one approach: register the agent once as its own identity and connect every system through the identity provider, so the agent no longer holds the credentials itself and gets its access from the provider each time. The five systems look like five separate problems, but it is the same problem every time. Below you walk through the pattern system by system.
Why those scattered credentials are the real problem
Connections between agents and resources appear without central control. Sometimes the credentials are even hardcoded in the code. That grows an unmanaged attack surface. A static token spread across your environment cannot be revoked or rotated centrally in one go when it leaks, not without breaking things elsewhere. And afterwards you cannot demonstrate which agent did something on behalf of which user at that moment.
The solution is a single principle you can apply in almost every situation: the agent only talks to your own identity provider (IDP) and gets short-lived, centrally managed tokens and secrets from it. The IDP is the central place that replaces the scattered static credentials with one policy.
The pattern you repeat five times
For every system it is the same three steps. Register the agent once as its own identity, with a human owner attached. In Okta you do that in Universal Directory: one place to register agents across every agent framework, every cloud and every SaaS environment, including the agents you built yourself. Then you configure the agent per system in the IDP and connect it with a fitting scope. The agent gets its access from the IDP each time and does not have to hold and maintain credentials for every connected resource.
The steps below follow that pattern each time. What differs is the type of resource the agent gets access to.
How do you give an agent access to an internal API?
For an internal API behind your own authorization server you use cross-app access. The authorization server issues a token with tightly bounded scopes, so the agent only gets the API rights one specific task needs. Cross-app access replaces the user's manual approval with a token exchange. The app making the request fetches an identity assertion from the identity provider and exchanges it for an access token to the resource app. No user is involved and no consent screen appears: the organisation records centrally and up front which actions an AI agent may carry out on behalf of a user, so that consent is already given on the user's behalf. The agent retrieves the right access token for the resource through the token exchange.
How do you give an agent access to an app without cross-app access?
Not every app supports cross-app access. For those apps the access runs through a managed consent flow, with Secure Token Storage underneath it. The user gives permission once, after which your own IDP holds the tokens and issues them to agents when they need them. This way a single user consent is enough (and not a fresh one for every new AI agent) and tokens are stored safely. And you see exactly which resources an agent is allowed to use.
Common mistake: asking for user consent again every session and treating that as the fixed model. Then every app negotiates its own access and nobody keeps central track of what happens. The identity provider should be the party that holds the user and agent context across systems.
How do you give an agent access to an API with a static key?
Sometimes there is no OAuth token but a static key. For that type you keep the secret in Okta Privileged Access. The secret stays in the vault and is issued on request instead of being written into the code. So the secret resource type returns a key from the vault, not an OAuth access token. Okta Privileged Access stores and rotates those credentials centrally and removes standing access. That applies to service accounts just as much as to shared and break-glass accounts.
Common mistake: handing the static key straight to the agent. Then the key sits in the agent and you cannot rotate or revoke it centrally.
How do you give an agent access through a service account?
A service account, like static tokens, is registered in a system with governance underneath it, such as Okta Privileged Access, not as an account you simply share or leave unmanaged. That keeps you in control of how agents use privileged access. Through the same OAuth flow, agents then get access to the service account credentials.
Common mistake: sharing one service account across several agents. Then you cannot scope access per agent and cannot revoke it. And you cannot trace which agent did what.
How do you give an agent access to an MCP server?
An MCP server comes under central management just like any other system. MCP is the standard for connecting AI models to external tools and data sources, and it increasingly supports the OAuth standard for authentication too. Cross-app access is the preferred route, but Secure Token Storage can hold tokens from any authorization server. That lets you secure and monitor an agent's access to the tools behind MCP as consistently as with any other system.
Cross-app access is now an official extension of the Model Context Protocol, under the name Enterprise-Managed Authorization (EMA). Okta is the first supported identity provider, and Anthropic's Claude already supports it for connectors such as Atlassian, Figma and Linear.
Common mistake: letting the MCP connection run outside the identity provider. Then the tool calls and the rights handed out stay outside the organisation's view and policy.
What now holds for all five systems
You have applied the same pattern five times, so the same properties hold for all five. No more scattered credentials, but access that comes from the identity provider each time and replaces standing access: issued only for what the agent needs and only for as long as it needs it. With OAuth that is a short-lived token, with a static key a secret that stays in the vault. That is exactly what NIST means by least privilege
The control you get on top of that applies to every system as well. You run agents through the same certification workflows as your other systems, so owners and managers can review and revoke access together with the security teams, with a full audit trail. If an agent runs off the rails, you can deactivate it in one action: your kill switch, with one audit trail across all systems. Every tool call and access attempt is logged, as is every authorization decision. You forward that telemetry to your SIEM.
You recognise the pattern once and reuse it, instead of setting up five separate credential silos. Every part traces back to open standards, so you do not run into lock-in at the identity level.
Working on agent access in your own environment? We are happy to take a look with you.
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